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On 4 September 2016, Hong Kong’s voters went to the polls to elect 
the 70 members of its legislature, known as the Legislative Council or 
LegCo. The election results largely maintained the existing distribution 
of power between democratic and pro-Beijing (or pro-establishment) 
forces. But the vote also reflected the emergence of increasing divisions 
within each of these camps and especially the rise of localism, a new 
political tendency that seems poised to dramatically transform Hong 
Kong’s political landscape. 
Since the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to China almost twenty 
years ago, on 1 July 1997, politics in Hong Kong has been shaped by 
the struggle over how to implement the “one country, two systems” for-
mula. The Basic Law, the constitutional document of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, promised “a high degree of autonomy” 
for its citizens, including most importantly universal suffrage in choos-
ing the city’s chief executive, who is currently selected by an electoral 
college dominated by supporters of Beijing. But despite several rounds 
of electoral reform since the handover, this promise remains far from 
being realized. Hopes that it would be achieved in time for the 2017 
chief-executive election were dashed in August 2014, when Beijing put 
forward an institutional framework for reform that effectively ruled out 
genuine universal suffrage. According to this proposal, a special com-
mittee under Beijing’s control would nominate all chief-executive can-
didates, thereby ensuring that China could vet every name on the ballot.
In reaction, Hong Kong student organizations launched a boycott 
of academic classes and staged a strike outside government headquar-
ters. When police attacked these students with tear gas, public outrage 
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sparked large-scale protests that merged with those of the civil-disobe-
dience movement for universal suffrage known as Occupy Central with 
Love and Peace. These protests, led by student groups and Hong Kong’s 
younger generation, quickly evolved into the Umbrella Movement, a 79-
day occupation of key sites in the city that began on 28 September 2014. 
The following year, in June 2015, China’s proposed electoral-reform 
framework—which required the approval of two-thirds of LegCo—was 
blocked by prodemocracy legislators. 
Although the Umbrella Movement has since dissipated, it galvanized 
criticism of integration between the city and the mainland, building sig-
nificant support among the younger generation for the idea of localism. 
At its heart, this broad term signifies a commitment to protecting the 
interests and identity of Hong Kong. Thus, localist demands center on 
defending such key elements of Hong Kong’s identity as its Cantonese 
language and its unique history and lifestyle. But they also go beyond 
cultural heritage to emphasize core civic values such as the rule of law 
and civil liberties, as well as Hong Kong’s economic and political inter-
ests. The scope of these demands has broadened as localism continues 
to evolve, most recently toward incorporating ideas of nation-building 
and self-determination. 
What is already indisputable, however, is that these ideas have 
brought an explicit expression of local identity to Hong Kong’s legisla-
tive politics, and that Beijing sees them as a threat. Beijing’s heavy-
handed intervention after the LegCo elections—disqualifying several 
localist lawmakers who refused to take the oath of office as written—is 
evidence of how much Beijing fears seeing the discourse on Hong Kong 
national- and self-determination become institutionalized. The decision 
significantly altered Beijing–Hong Kong relations by damaging the ter-
ritory’s autonomy, and it has potential implications for Hong Kong’s 
ability to preserve its citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Historically, Hong Kong democracy advocates and lawmakers from 
established democratic parties, known collectively as pandemocrats, 
have viewed the democratization of Hong Kong as intrinsically linked 
to that of China. In keeping with this belief, the city’s civil society has 
held annual candlelight vigils on June 4 to honor the victims of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre, and has lent continuing support to China’s 
prodemocracy movement. Two decades of pandemocrats’ failed efforts 
to achieve universal suffrage, however, have led nascent localist groups 
to start calling for a new strategy that focuses purely on Hong Kong’s 
own development. With this position, the localists are waging a two-
front campaign, attacking not only the pro-establishment camp but also 
pandemocrats for their commitment to the idea that Hong Kong should 
remain part of China. 
The September 2016 election was a milestone. It showed that localist 
discourse and the debate over relations with China had for the first time 
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displaced universal suffrage as dominant campaign issues. Turnout rose to 
record levels, reaching 58.3 percent for the 2016 LegCo races—the high-
est level in Hong Kong’s history and 5 percentage points above 2012’s 
turnout.1 With more than 2.2 million registered voters participating (of a 
total population of 7.2 million) and long lines outside a number of polling 
stations, the 2016 vote continued the trend of record-breaking turnout set 
by district-council elections the previous year. Fueling both campaigns 
was the enthusiasm of young people, sparked by the many new faces who 
have entered politics since the Umbrella Movement began.
The Changing Legislative Landscape
Hong Kong has an executive-led governing system that limits the 
power of its legislature, but LegCo still performs an important political 
function. Its role in monitoring the administration and providing a forum 
for policy debate is particularly critical. In recent decades, the legisla-
ture has significantly shaped Hong Kong’s democratic development, if 
only by passing or blocking government bills. 
The distribution of power within LegCo determines its ability to play 
that role. Of the Council’s 70 seats, 35 are directly elected by universal 
suffrage in five geographical constituencies. Another 30 are elected by 
professional and special-interest groups known as functional constituen-
cies. Most of these are dominated by business interests, and their votes 
are cast by leaders of organizations and corporations instead of rank-
and-file citizens. Finally, 5 spots are known as “super seats” and are 
filled by universal suffrage from a territory-wide pool of candidates. 
(Only district councilors can run for super seats, though, which techni-
cally makes these seats a type of functional constituency.) Traditionally, 
pro-establishment parties and candidates have enjoyed an advantage in 
the functional constituencies, which has guaranteed them a structural 
majority in the LegCo. By contrast, pandemocrats have typically won 
seats only in those few functional constituencies where all members of a 
profession—for example, education or health services—have individual 
votes.
The September 2016 election was widely expected to benefit the pro-
establishment camp. During the campaign, localist groups had declined 
to coordinate their efforts with pandemocratic parties, leading both 
to compete for and divide the nonestablishment vote. It was therefore 
anticipated that the pro-establishment camp would win a majority of 
the geographic constituency seats and gain a two-thirds majority in the 
LegCo overall. With majorities of both the functional and geographi-
cal constituencies, a group of legislators could amend LegCo’s rules 
of procedure—to curb the pandemocrats’ use of the filibuster, for in-
stance. And with two-thirds of LegCo as a whole (or in other words, 47 
seats), pro-Beijing forces could enact changes to Hong Kong’s political 
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* Percentage figures only include geographic constituencies, while seat count figures include 
both functional and geographic constituencies.
** People Power and the League of Social Democrats ran competing campaigns in 2012.                
Source: www.elections.gov.hk/legco2016/eng/results.html?1477430097302; www.elections.
gov.hk/legco2012/eng/results.html.
Table—Hong Kong legislaTive CounCil eleCTion ResulTs 
(2012 and 2016)
LegCo Seat Count Percent of Vote*
2012 2016 2012 2016
Pro-establishment parties
Democratic Alliance for the Better-
ment and Progress of Hong Kong 13 12 20.2 16.7
Federation of Trade Unions 6 5 7.1 7.8
Liberal Party 5 4 2.7 1.0
New People’s Party 2 3 3.8 7.7
Independents supported by the Beijing 
Liaison Office 2 3 4.0 6.1
Other pro-establishment parties and 
independents 15 13 4.9 0.8
Total 43 40 42.7 40.2
Pandemocratic parties
Democratic Party 6 7 13.7 9.2
Civic Party 6 6 14.1 9.6
Labour Party 4 1 6.2 4.7
Neo Democrats 1 0 1.6 1.5
Association for Democracy and 
People’s Livelihood 1 0 1.7 1.5
People Power / League of Social 
Democrats** 4 2 14.6 7.2
Other pandemocratic parties 5 5 4.5 2.3
Total 27 21 56.2 36.0
Localist parties
ALLinHK / Youngspiration n/a 2 n/a 3.8
Civic Passion / Proletariat Political In-
stitute / Hong Kong Resurgence Order n/a 1 n/a 7.1
Demosistō n/a 1 n/a 2.3
Democracy Groundwork n/a 1 n/a 1.8
Land Justice League n/a 1 n/a 4.0
Other localist parties n/a 2 n/a n/a
Total n/a 8 n/a 19.0
Other non-aligned parties n/a 1 n/a 4.8
structure—for example, by adopting Beijing’s proposed chief-executive 
election reform for 2017 or the harsh “antisubversion” national-security 
law that Beijing had sought in 2003, both of which the pandemocrats 
blocked.
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Fears of a pro-establishment electoral victory were not borne out. 
Instead, the results gave a surprising overall gain to the pandemocratic 
and localist camps. Taken together, they won 19 of the 35 geographical 
constituencies, 3 of the 5 super seats, and an astonishing 7 seats in the 
functional constituencies. Their total win—29 seats—represented a net 
gain of 2 seats over 2012 (see Table). Crucially, they more than met the 
vital threshold of 24 seats—a third of LegCo—that they needed to retain 
their minority veto. Localist candidates supporting Hong Kong’s right 
to self-determination won 6 geographical-constituency seats, and can-
didates linked to the 2014 mass protests earned 2 seats in the functional 
constituencies.2 Among the pandemocrats, the Democratic Party—the 
mainstay of the liberal camp since 1994—reclaimed its traditional dom-
inance by winning an additional seventh seat, despite years of declining 
vote shares. Meanwhile, the Civic Party retained its six seats and thus 
secured its position as the second-largest force among the pandemo-
crats. 
The election marked a watershed in Hong Kong politics in three dis-
tinct ways. First, it highlighted the emerging ideological battles that 
are increasingly fragmenting the political field. Although the election 
has preserved the traditional 60 to 40 percent split in the popular vote 
between liberal and conservative forces, respectively, a wider array of 
winning parties and candidates now fall within the nonestablishment 
camp. Lawmakers who back the establishment are once again in the 
majority, with the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress 
of Hong Kong (DAB) remaining the largest single party in LegCo (with 
12 seats) and the most popular party (with the largest single-party vote 
share—a sixth of the total). Overall, however, the victory of pro-Beijing 
forces was hugely facilitated by Hong Kong’s undemocratic electoral 
system, which awarded 22 of the 30 functional constituency seats to 
pro-establishment candidates while the nonestablishment forces won 21 
of the 40 seats elected through universal suffrage. 
There were also signs of deepening divisions within the conservative 
camp. The New People’s Party (NPP) picked up 3 seats and doubled its 
vote share largely at the expense of the business-friendly Liberal Party, 
which failed to score a single win among geographic constituencies. 
Both parties targeted middle-class, pro-establishment voters. The NPP 
is led by veteran lawmaker and former secretary for security, Regina Ip, 
who has expressed interest in running for chief executive in 2017. Ip’s 
visit the day after the election to the Beijing Liaison Office—the base 
of Chinese power and influence in Hong Kong—confirmed speculation 
that her party was supported by Beijing.
There were vote shifts and realignments in the nonestablishment 
camp as well. The election showed that the localists—as the new radi-
cals and the political vanguard—could steal the limelight from the pan-
democrats. Indeed, smaller groups across the pandemocratic spectrum 
162 Journal of Democracy
were hit hard, and several of their incumbents lost. The moderate Asso-
ciation for Democracy and People’s Livelihood is no longer represented 
in LegCo, and the left-wing Labour Party has lost 3 of its 4 seats. Two 
radical democratic groups that were older than the Umbrella Movement, 
People Power and the League of Social Democrats, lost half their votes, 
and their electoral alliance managed to win only a pair of seats. One of 
these—earned by high-profile lawmaker and activist Leung Kwok-hung 
(nicknamed Long Hair)—was the last available seat in his constituency, 
and he won it by the narrow margin of slightly more than a -thousand 
votes. 
Second, the election signaled that a new generation of activists had 
arrived in politics. Even as left-wing pandemocratic groups struggled, 
localists with roots in community activism surged ahead. In fact, two 
LegCo newcomers had previously launched their own grassroots orga-
nizations—Democracy Groundwork and the Land Justice League—that 
played prominent roles in the Umbrella Movement. The founder of the 
Land Justice League, Eddie Chu, had been a conservation and environ-
mental activist for more than a decade, and his campaign exposed links 
among local landowners, organized crime, and political institutions in 
the New Territories. He won more votes than any other candidate in the 
geographical constituencies, suggesting that he and other new lawmak-
ers might now professionalize their confrontational style by providing 
solid evidence of government mismanagement. 
Much of this energy is owing to the youthful veterans of the Umbrella 
Movement. A telling example is Nathan Law, a former student leader 
of the Umbrella Movement protests who at age 23 became the youngest 
legislator in Hong Kong’s history. Law is the former secretary-general 
of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), and he cofounded 
Demosistō, a center-left party, with other student activists in early 2016. 
(Another cofounder was Joshua Wong, who has been the public face of 
Hong Kong social movements since his high-school days. He was still 
only 19 years old in September 2016, too young to run for office.) In his 
campaign, Law promised to serve only two terms—there is currently no 
term limit—stressing the need for fresh faces in LegCo. 
Demosistō and several other newly established parties now champion 
distinctly localist agendas. Another example is Youngspiration, which 
won a pair of LegCo seats in September 2016, including one for its 
founder Sixtus Leung (nicknamed Baggio). Youngspiration had been 
formed the year before, in order to field candidates for the 2015 district-
council elections—Hong Kong’s version of local-government races—
and its original emphasis was on district and community work, a con-
ventional theme in such local contests. But Youngspiration also stood 
out from the field; it offered a clear concept of Hong Kong identity and, 
unusually, made direct references to the protests in its campaign. A year 
later, its rhetorical emphasis shifted from the Umbrella Movement to 
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localism, but it openly advocated Hong Kong’s national self-determi-
nation while pursuing a bottom-up strategy. Both Youngspiration law-
makers immediately brought their 
radical stance into the legislature. 
During the oath-taking ceremony, 
they changed key words and mis-
pronounced “People’s Republic of 
China” in a way that was deemed 
vulgar and derisive toward China. 
This made them prime targets of 
pro-Beijing groups and the admin-
istration of Chief Executive C.Y. 
Leung, and raised doubts about 
whether they would be able to take 
their seats. In early December, the 
administration sought the legal ejection from LegCo of four additional 
members on grounds that they had failed to take the oath of office val-
idly.3 The four comprised veteran lawmaker Long Hair plus three newly 
elected localists, one of whom was Nathan Law.
Youngspiration ran its LegCo campaign through an alliance, known 
as ALLinHK, that included five other post–Umbrella Movement organi-
zations. Hong Kong Indigenous (HKI), a more radical localist group that 
was not part of ALLinHK, has embraced a confrontational protest style. 
It criticizes both traditional social movements for their inability to bring 
real change to Hong Kong and LegCo as an institution dominated by 
establishment-friendly parties. Although it fields candidates for LegCo, 
HKI refuses to become a conventional political party. It seeks to use the 
Council as a platform for promoting localist ideology, and has vowed to 
use any resources gained through politics to fight for Hong Kong’s in-
dependence. The government barred HKI’s leader, Edward Leung, from 
running for a LegCo seat, but Leung threw his support behind Baggio 
and remained prominent on the campaign trail. The two of them were 
supported by an efficient team of young volunteers. 
The success of these and other actors associated with the 2014 pro-
tests signaled the institutionalization of civic activism in the post–
Umbrella Movement era. Here is the third takeaway from the LegCo 
election. September 2016 sealed the Umbrella Movement’s legacy of 
a politicized younger generation. Yet neither the movement itself nor 
its core demand for universal suffrage was a central campaign issue. 
Rather, these themes have been eclipsed by the new emphasis on such 
localist themes as identity and self-determination. This shift has allowed 
former Umbrella Movement activists to reach a much broader audience. 
One veteran legislator, Leung Yiu-chung, who campaigned across Hong 
Kong for a super seat (which he won), even said that his prominence in 
the movement cost him votes.4 
C.Y. Leung’s administration 
is widely seen as having en-
abled Beijing’s hard-line ap-
proach to the “one country, 
two systems” framework, 
with the “one country” side 
of the formula increasingly 
emphasized.
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Yet not everything went smoothly for the localists, who suffered two 
surprise defeats. Gary Fan, a pandemocrat who called himself a mod-
erate localist, and veteran lawmaker Raymond Wong—in the greatest 
upset of the election—both narrowly lost their seats. Wong’s loss by 
a mere 424 votes was all the more unexpected considering his leading 
role in the localist movement and his electoral alliance with two localist 
organizations.5 As one of the government’s most prolific critics, Wong 
had often filibustered, and had been one of those bringing a new and 
more confrontational style to the legislature. It remains to be seen how 
Wong’s absence will change LegCo’s culture.
Localism: Origins and Evolution
That localist groups and candidates managed to set the agenda in 
September 2016 is all the more impressive given how young their move-
ment is. The suggestion that Hong Kong had distinct economic and so-
cial interests—much less a distinct identity—from China’s only entered 
the broad public conversation with the emergence of the Hong Kong 
heritage movement in 2005. Around that time, civic activists took up the 
cause of protecting local-heritage sites from redevelopment, trying and 
failing to save the historic Star Ferry Pier from demolition, for instance. 
In 2008, a group of self-avowed moderate localists organized online to 
research and discuss Hong Kong–China relations.6 Their findings in-
spired the complaint that members of Hong Kong’s political establish-
ment, including pandemocratic lawmakers, had been promoting policies 
that favored China’s interests over Hong Kong’s.
Chief Executive C.Y. Leung’s confrontational style and poor gover-
nance record have frustrated large segments of society and fueled this 
complaint’s rapidly growing popularity. His administration—which will 
end at the close of June 2017 as Leung has chosen not to run again—
is widely seen as having enabled Beijing’s hard-line approach to the 
“one country, two systems” framework, with the “one country” side of 
the formula increasingly emphasized. Beijing has aimed above all to 
control Hong Kong’s political development with an eye to avoiding un-
rest while ensuring economic stability. Beijing’s means to this end have 
been dominance over political and media institutions; integration of the 
Hong Kong and Chinese economies; and control over ideas, as typified 
by the use of “patriotic education” to mold Hong Kong’s national con-
sciousness. 
Localists across the political spectrum agree that these policies threat-
en the interests and culture of Hong Kong, and that the government does 
not represent the interests of its people as it strives to please Beijing. 
They disagree, however, about how to respond and what it will mean 
for the city’s future. Left-wing localists tend to see domestic politics 
and Hong Kong–China relations through the lens of capitalist exploita-
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tion, and consequently call for transforming the socioeconomic system. 
Moderates favor working within the system to achieve reform, hoping 
ultimately to turn the Basic Law’s guarantee of a higher level of autono-
my for Hong Kong into a reality. Since 2011, more radical and populist 
strands of localism have also emerged. Chinese tourists and traders have 
fed these feelings by, for instance, 
flooding into northern Hong Kong to 
buy vast quantities of baby formula. 
The vogue among Chinese mothers-to-
be for moving to Hong Kong to give 
birth, moreover, has seemed to be yet 
another way in which Chinese interests 
override those of Hong Kong. 
Much of modern localist ideology 
draws from the work of ethnographer 
Chin Wan, especially his 2011 volume 
Hong Kong as a City-State. The book 
imagined a Hong Kong that was all but completely autonomous with 
regard to China. It stirred localists by coherently explaining how the 
territory’s identity differed from that of the mainland. Building on these 
ideas, legislators such as Raymond Wong and groups such as Civic Pas-
sion began to confront the cultural and economic “mainlandization” of 
Hong Kong, denying that its values and norms were convergent with 
China’s. The vision of Hong Kong as an independent nation next re-
ceived widespread attention in early 2014 in the magazine Undergrad, 
which is published by the student union of Hong Kong University. The 
students went on to republish the articles in an edited volume on the eve 
of the Umbrella Movement protests. 
The Umbrella Movement marked a turning point for localism by dem-
onstrating that even three months of widespread demonstrations could 
not secure universal suffrage. Given this reality, localists began to argue 
that the only way forward was to build a Hong Kong nation with some 
form of self-determination or outright independence from China. During 
the run-up to the LegCo election, this idea gained traction. In Febru-
ary 2016, HKI was involved in an outbreak of civil unrest that became 
Hong Kong’s biggest riot since the 1960s. Shortly afterward, HKI leader 
Edward Leung competed in a LegCo by-election, finishing third among 
seven candidates with 15 percent of the vote. His respectable showing 
signaled that a sizeable part of the populace accepted localist ideas. A 
month later, former student-union leader Andy Chan Ho-tin founded the 
Hong Kong National Party (HKNP), which openly proclaimed an inde-
pendent Hong Kong Republic as its goal. Both Hong Kong and Chinese 
authorities were swift with their condemnations, and the HKNP was 
denied registration.7 
The government’s opposition to localism hardened. On 14 July 2016, 
The Umbrella Movement 
marked a turning point 
for localism by demon-
strating that even three 
months of widespread 
demonstrations could not 
secure universal suffrage.
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the Electoral Affairs Commission ruled that all LegCo candidates would 
have to sign a form acknowledging Hong Kong as an inalienable part 
of China, per the Basic Law. This requirement was seen as singling out 
localist contenders. After all, candidates were already required by LegCo 
ordinance to uphold the Basic Law. Moreover, the measure gave authori-
ties the power to monitor and potentially disqualify candidates—even 
nominees—for advocating independence. In all, six localist candidates 
were barred from running even though most of them, including Edward 
Leung, signed the form. And although he was the only of the six barred 
candidates who had a real chance of being elected, outrage over the gov-
ernment’s action sparked Hong Kong’s first ever overt rally for indepen-
dence, organized by the HKNP. According to the high-end estimate, a 
crowd of ten-thousand people, most of them young, gathered in Tamar 
Park to hear the banned candidates speak. (As for Leung, disqualification 
did not stop him from campaigning on behalf of Youngspiration’s Baggio, 
who promised to promote Leung’s ideas if elected.) 
These developments sparked a realignment of policy priorities within 
both the Hong Kong government and the Beijing Liaison Office. If once 
authorities had reacted to unrest by seeking to avoid excessive confron-
tation, lately the official stance has hardened. Particularly since the Um-
brella Movement, C.Y. Leung’s personnel appointments have reflected 
his desire for total institutional control and absolute loyalty. (A stark ex-
ample is the way that he has used his power to name members of univer-
sity councils.) And because C.Y. Leung, unlike his predecessors, lacks 
strong backing from business and traditional leftist pro-Beijing groups, 
he has had to rely heavily on the Beijing Liaison Office for support. As 
a result, that organ’s influence on Hong Kong’s domestic politics has 
grown, and its approach has become more explicitly interventionist. 
The Legislative Council is a key stage on which these trends have 
played out. The Liaison Office had long been suspected of providing 
logistical support to established conservative groups, such as the DAB, 
that are known for friendliness to Beijing. But starting in 2008, and 
particularly during the September 2016 election, the Liaison Office has 
supplemented this strategy by grooming nominally independent LegCo 
candidates, generally with a professional middle-class background, and 
giving their campaigns significant support.8 
This tactic has helped the Liaison Office to create its own de facto 
LegCo power base, which now includes three formally independent leg-
islators, all of them newcomers to the Council. The victory of one, dis-
trict councilor Junius Ho, hinted at the close ties between the Liaison 
Office and Chief Executive C.Y. Leung. Ho, former president of the 
Law Society, had made his name by vocally criticizing Occupy Cen-
tral protests and defeating a veteran pandemocrat in the 2015 district-
council elections. He then rose quickly to a local administrative position 
that gave him an executive role at the Heung Yee Kuk, a powerful pro-
167Malte Philipp Kaeding
establishment advisory body in the New Territories. Three months after 
that, he won his LegCo seat and began calling for pro-Beijing changes to 
the Kuk.9 Ho’s opponent in the LegCo race, Ken Chow, claimed that in-
dividuals with mainland links had first offered him money to withdraw, 
and then, when he refused, had threatened him and his family until he 
dropped out.10
Ironically, these interventionist tactics are actually fragmenting the 
pro-establishment camp. The Liaison office’s strategic maneuvering has 
forced it to work with various competing interests and to reshuffle old 
alliances. A lot of its resources in the 2016 campaign were allocated to 
newer political parties, especially the NPP (whose novice legislator Eu-
nice Yung has been alleged to have close family links to Beijing).11 Old 
allies in the same constituencies, such as the Federation of Trade Unions 
(FTU), were ignored. Moreover, the NPP’s willingness to embrace Liai-
son Office support is a departure from its customary appeal to conserva-
tive middle-class voters, and might cost the party in the long run. 
A Growing Political Force
Despite government resistance, localism is here to stay as a force 
shaping Hong Kong’s political development and animating its youth. 
That localist candidates won nearly a fifth (19 percent) of the 2016 
popular vote confirms that localist ideas now belong to the political 
mainstream. Indeed, established parties from across the political spec-
trum now feel compelled to respond to the localist agenda. Two tra-
ditional pandemocratic groups, the Civic Party and the Association 
for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, amended their manifestos to 
include localist references and even calls for self-determination. Many 
of the successful young district councilors and LegCo candidates from 
the Civic Party and even the Democratic Party (which has long pro-
moted the idea of a democratic China) either identify as localists or 
sympathize with them. 
Localism has even spread to the pro-establishment camp. Financial 
Secretary John Tsang, considered an aspirant to the post of chief exec-
utive, recently called localism a constructive force that could improve 
the territory and cultivate a sense of pride.12 During the 2016 LegCo 
campaign, the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Unions called on voters 
to “stand up for Hong Kong values,” and even a DAB candidate cam-
paigned on the slogan “Yes to localism, no to splittism!” 
Popular understandings of localism continue to vary greatly, how-
ever. It would be misleading to assume that everyone using this term 
looks critically on Hong Kong–Beijing relations or favors separatism. 
Nevertheless, the newly mainstream focus on Hong Kong’s interests 
above other considerations has reshaped the political landscape. The old 
rift between pro-establishment forces and pandemocrats can no longer 
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explain Hong Kong’s politics. The split between those who support and 
those who oppose the establishment now looms larger. 
Recent opinion polls confirm a strengthening of Hong Kong iden-
tity. In a June 2016 survey conducted by the Public Opinion Programme 
at the University of Hong Kong, 42 percent of respondents identified 
themselves as Hong Kongers only, with no reference to China. Among 
those between 18 and 29, over 60 percent did so.13 And although these 
ideas do not automatically translate into a demand for independence, 
many, especially among the young, see at least a strong correlation. 
(Even in local secondary schools, dedicated study groups and organiza-
tions with names such as “Studentlocalism” have begun springing up to 
promote Hong Kong’s independence.) Remarkably, independence—an 
option rarely thought of even two years ago—drew support from 17 
percent of respondents in a survey that the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong published in July 2016. Another 23 percent expressed ambiva-
lence, which means that a full 40 percent of Hong Kongers would not 
rule out the idea of independence outright.14 As a point of comparison, 
it took the Scottish National Party, one of Europe’s most successful na-
tionalist movements, decades of campaigning to reach similar levels of 
support for regional autonomy. 
How Will the Localists Perform in Office?
Localism’s fate rests largely with the newly elected localists and their 
ability to perform in office. Will they favor a confrontational approach 
within LegCo? Whether and how the pandemocrats, the establishment 
camp, and the Hong Kong government engages them will go a long way 
toward answering that question. It will take veteran politicians with deep 
institutional knowledge of and experience with cross-party dialogue to 
engage the localists. Yet some key figures who could have played this 
role (including former LegCo president Jasper Tsang and Democratic 
Party chairwoman Emily Lau) retired in 2016. 
One promising figure in this regard is the pandemocrat Alvin Yeung, 
who at age 35 is the rising star of the Civic Party. He has had some 
success uniting mainstream liberals and building bridges linking non-
establishment forces. Yeung entered LegCo only in February 2016, via 
a by-election, but his cordial relations with localist Edward Leung dur-
ing that campaign were seen as an omen of possible future coopera-
tion between the two camps. Further evidence for this view comes from 
Yeung’s successful campaign strategy in September, which saw him 
unite all prodemocratic candidates in his constituency. 
On the localist side, a lawmaker to watch is the 33-year-old leader 
of Civic Passion, Cheng Chung-tai. He brings to the chamber both deep 
academic expertise and firsthand experience with mainland China’s po-
litical reality (he earned a doctorate at Beijing University). This, in ad-
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dition to his already distinctive position in the nonestablishment camp, 
could help Cheng become a key person—especially if he can transform 
Civic Passion into a full-fledged political party. 
An unprecedented level of polarization, however, is already visible 
in new LegCo, and new tensions are no doubt in store. An indication of 
what might lie ahead is an inquiry into the citizenship of the new LegCo 
president, initiated by the novice legislator and former journalist Eddie 
Chu of the Land Justice League. His investigative approach to politics 
is likely to put new pressure on pro-establishment elites. Also of note, 
the popularity of youth-led Demosistō among middle-class voters could 
fuel a resurgence of moderate left-wing politics along with localism. 
The success of the new wave of localism and the discourse on Hong 
Kong independence depends on the ability of these novice politicians to 
unify their supporters and move the debate forward.
Meanwhile, the C.Y. Leung administration, in alliance with pro-
establishment forces, seems determined to curb localism and contain 
the spread of pro-independence ideas at all costs. Its heavy-handed ap-
proach is degrading key features of Hong Kong’s political system—in-
cluding the separation of powers and the independence of the legislature 
and the judiciary.15 
Indeed, in a highly controversial move, the Standing Committee of 
China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a unilateral Basic 
Law interpretation on the issue of the Youngspiration lawmakers’ oath-
taking, prior to a Hong Kong court decision on the matter.16 The pro-
Beijing media’s identification of various types of oath violations—all 
targeting localist lawmakers as distinguished from the several pandemo-
crats who also protested during the ceremony—suggests that Beijing 
seeks to strip localism of any institutional representation whatsoever. 
The beginning of LegCo’s current term (set to run until 2020) has 
thus seen a dramatic escalation of confrontation. The NPC’s Basic Law 
interpretation suggests that Beijing can potentially redefine all the guar-
antees given in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. The implica-
tions for Hong Kong’s political development are significant. Radical 
localist groups are likely to be limited in their ability to use the institu-
tional route for promoting their ideas, but they could use a forthcoming 
by-election (to replace the two disqualified candidates) as a plebiscite 
on Hong Kong self-determination. 
Most importantly, the radical localists have succeeded in forcing the 
central government in Beijing to lay bare its contempt for Hong Kong’s 
autonomy. In 2014, Beijing made it clear that Hong Kong’s chief execu-
tive cannot be freely elected; now it has shown starkly that the city’s al-
ready weak lawmaking body can be overridden and that Beijing’s inter-
pretations of the Basic Law can be used to render local courts helpless.
This development is all the more worrisome given that new contro-
versies are now likely to erupt with greater frequency. Moreover, the un-
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precedented levels of enthusiasm for candidates such as Edward Leung 
and groups such as HKI also signal that many people are willing to sup-
port a politics of confrontation.
Hong Kong’s next political milestone will be the election of the 
chief executive on 26 March 2017. C.Y. Leung will be leaving. A 
leader less divisive than he has been could sap some of localism’s 
momentum, though Beijing’s recent actions against localist lawmak-
ers are likely to enrage young Hong Kongers. Furthermore, the overall 
constraints on Hong Kong’s dysfunctional political system will remain 
in place, as will Beijing’s hard-line strategy toward the territory. And 
the longer Hong Kong’s identity is seen as threatened, the more emo-
tional resonance the idea of self-determination will gain. Already it 
has added a new layer of complexity to what it means to be a Hong 
Konger, transforming national identity and giving young people in 
particular a different perspective on the future. The changes ushered in 
by the 2016 LegCo election—a new alliance between Beijing and pro-
establishment parties, a repositioning of pandemocratic forces, and an 
elevation of localist politics—all point to growing uncertainty in the 
years ahead. The short-term prospects, at least, appear grim, given the 
power and the intransigence of Beijing.
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